Second Intifada | |||||||||
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Part of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Units involved | |||||||||
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Casualties and losses | |||||||||
29 September 2000 – 1 January 2005: ~1,010[7][failed verification][8] Israelis total:• 644–773 Israeli civilians killed by Palestinians; • 215–301 Israeli troops killed by Palestinians |
29 September 2000 – 1 January 2005: 3,179[8][9][10]–3,354[7] Palestinians total:• 2,739–3,168 Palestinians killed by Israeli troops;* • 152–406 Palestinians killed by Palestinians; • 34 Palestinians killed by Israeli civilians | ||||||||
55 foreign nationals/citizens total: • 45 foreigners killed by Palestinians; • 10 foreigners killed by Israeli troops[7] | |||||||||
*For the controversial issue of distinguishing Palestinian civilian/combatant casualties, see § Casualties. |
The Second Intifada (Arabic: الانتفاضة الثانية, romanized: Al-Intifāḍa aṯ-Ṯhāniya, lit. 'The Second Uprising'; Hebrew: האינתיפאדה השנייה Ha-Intifada ha-Shniya), also known as the Al-Aqsa Intifada,[11] was a major uprising by Palestinians against the Israeli occupation, characterized by a period of heightened violence in the Palestinian territories and Israel between 2000 and 2005.[11][12][13] The general triggers for the unrest are speculated to have been centered on the failure of the 2000 Camp David Summit, which was expected to reach a final agreement on the Israeli–Palestinian peace process in July 2000.[14] An uptick in violent incidents started in September 2000, after Israeli politician Ariel Sharon made a provocative visit to the Temple Mount;[15][14] the visit itself was peaceful, but, as anticipated, sparked protests and riots that Israeli police put down with rubber bullets, live ammunition, and tear gas.[16] Within the first few days of the uprising, the IDF had fired one million rounds of ammunition.[17]
High numbers of casualties were caused among civilians as well as combatants, contrasting with the relatively less violent nature of the First Intifada (1987–1993). The suicide bombings carried out by Palestinian militant factions, became one of the more prominent features of the Intifada and mainly targeted Israeli civilians.[18][19][20][21][22] Israeli security forces engaged in gunfights, targeted killings, tank attacks, and airstrikes; Palestinians engaged in gunfights, suicide bombings (the first of which occurred in March 2001[17]), stone-throwing, and rocket attacks.[23][24] During the first few weeks of the uprising, the ratio of Palestinians to Israelis killed was around 20 to 1.[17] With a combined casualty figure for combatants and civilians, the violence is estimated to have resulted in the deaths of approximately 3,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis, as well as 64 foreign nationals.[25]
Many consider the Sharm el-Sheikh Summit of 2005 to have ended the uprising,[26] as Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon agreed to take definitive steps to de-escalate the hostilities between the two sides: all Palestinian militant factions would stop all acts of violence against all Israelis everywhere, and Israel would likewise cease all military activity against all Palestinians everywhere.[27][28] They also reaffirmed their commitment to the "roadmap for peace" that had been proposed by the Quartet on the Middle East in 2003. Additionally, Sharon agreed to release 900 of the 7,500 Palestinian prisoners held by Israel at the time[29] and further stated that Israeli troops would withdraw from those parts of the West Bank that they had re-occupied while fighting Palestinian militants during the uprising.
statspage
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).Strategic action by the two main Palestinian militant organizations, Fatah and Hamas, during the second intifada or uprising against the Israeli state and people (2000—5). ... during the second intifada, or uprising, of Palestinians against Israel between 2000 and 2005
The globalization of the Arab–Israeli conflict during the period of the second intifada against Israel (from the autumn 2000 through at least the spring of 2005) has fostered anti-Jewish violence in Europe and throughout the world.
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Suicide terror, lethal attacks indiscriminately carried out against civilians via self-immolation, attained prominence in the Palestinian repertoire beginning in March 2001. From that point until the end of 2005, at which point they virtually ceased, 57 suicide bombings were carried out, causing 491 civilian deaths, 73% of the total civilians killed by Palestinian resistance organizations and 50% of all Israeli fatalities during this period. While not the modal coercive tactic, suicide terror was the most efficient in terms of lethality, our basic measure of its efficacy.
In the early years of the 21st century, Israel, the West Bank and Gaza became the region of the world with the highest frequency of - and the highest per capita death toll due to - suicide bombing.
As part of the violence perpetrated by the Palestinians during the second intifada, suicide bombings played a particularly prominent role and served as the primary effective weapon in the hands of the planners.
This article attempts to identify the end of the second intifada by focusing on the incidence of suicide bombings, arguably the most important element of second intifada-related violence.
The period of the second Intifada significantly differs from other historical periods in Israeli history, because it has been characterized by intensive and numerous suicide attacks that have made civilian life into a battlefront.
Based on the assumption that there was no longer one front or one line of contact, Israel was carrying out dozens of simultaneous operations on the ground and in the air on a daily basis, including TKs, which were supposed to have multi-dimensional effects. According to Byman, TKs were mostly attractive to Israelis as they satisfied domestic demands for a forceful response to Palestinian terrorism. Byman also believes that by bolstering public morale, the TKs helped counter one of the terrorists' primary objectives – to reduce the faith of Israelis in their own government.