Back Cierre cognitivo (filosofía) Spanish انسداد شناختی Persian Penutupan kognitif (filsafat) ID 認知的閉鎖 Japanese 认知的封闭 Chinese
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In philosophy of science and philosophy of mind, cognitive closure is the proposition that human minds are constitutionally incapable of solving certain perennial philosophical problems.[1] Owen Flanagan calls this position anti-constructive naturalism or the "new mysterianism" and the primary advocate of the hypothesis, Colin McGinn,[2][3] calls it transcendental naturalism acknowledging the possibility that solutions may be knowable to an intelligent non-human of some kind. According to McGinn, such philosophical questions include the mind-body problem, identity of the self, foundations of meaning, free will, and knowledge, both a priori and empirical.[4]
- ^ Leslie Marsh (ed.), Hayek in Mind: Hayek's Philosophical Psychology, Emerald Group Publishing, 2011, p. xv.
- ^ Harris, Errol E (2006), Reflections on the Problem of Consciousness, p. 51,
McGinn's stance, while he denies the possibility of ever understanding the causal connection, may be regarded as "naturalistic" in the sense that he does not reject the validity of neuro-physiological theory, and does not doubt that brain activity accompanies conscious states.
. - ^ Ross Wilson (ed.), The Meaning of "Life" in Romantic Poetry and Poetics, Routledge, 2009, p. 88: "[McGinn] calls his stance "transcendental naturalism..."
- ^ McGinn, Colin (1994). "The Problem of Philosophy". Philosophical Studies. 76 (2–3): 133–56. doi:10.1007/bf00989821. S2CID 170454227.
It combines deep epistemic transcendence with the denial that what thus transcends is thereby non-natural.