Imperial German plans for the invasion of the United States

Imperial German invasion of the United States
DatePlanned between 1897 and 1903
Location
Status Planned but never carried out
Belligerents
 United States
Republic of Cuba (1902–1959) Cuba
 German Empire
Commanders and leaders
William McKinley
Theodore Roosevelt
John D. Long
William H. Moody
United States Samuel B. M. Young
United States Charles Heywood
United States George F. Elliott
United States Charles F. Shoemaker
United States Navy Robley D. Evans
United States Navy Charles J. Train
United States Navy Daniel S. Lamont
Russell A. Alger
John M. Hay
Republic of Cuba (1902–1959) Tomás Estrada Palma
Wilhelm II
Prince of Hohenlohe
Bernhard von Bülow
Alfred von Schlieffen
German Empire Friedrich von Hollmann
German Empire Alfred von Tirpitz
German Empire Eduard von Capelle
German Empire Hugo von Pohl
German Empire Friedrich von Ingenohl
German Empire Albert William Henry
German Empire Henning von Holtzendorff
German Empire Wilhelm von Büchsel
German Empire Otto von Diederichs
German Empire Eberhard von Mantey
Units involved
U.S. Army
 U.S. Navy
 United States Marine Corps
United States
Revenue Cutter Service
 Imperial German Army
 Imperial German Navy
Strength
Ground forces:
~100,000–200,000 total
Naval forces:
~160–175 ships[1]
~11 battleships
(projected)
Ground forces:
~100,000 total
Naval forces:
~60 warships
~40–60 cargo ships
(projected)

Imperial German plans for the invasion of the United States were ordered by staff officers from 1897 to 1903 as training exercises in planning for war. The hypothetical operation was supposed to force the US to bargain from a weak position and to sever its growing economic and political connections in the Pacific Ocean, the Caribbean, and South America so that German influence could increase there. Junior officers made various plans, but none were seriously considered and the project was dropped in 1906.

The first plan was made in the winter of 1897–1898, by Lieutenant Eberhard von Mantey, and targeted mainly American naval bases in Hampton Roads to reduce and constrain the US Navy and threaten Washington, D.C.

In March 1899, after significant gains made by the US in the Spanish–American War, the plan was altered to focus on a land invasion of New York City and Boston. In August 1901, Lieutenant Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz spied on the target areas and reported back.

A third plan was drawn up in November 1903 by naval staff officer Wilhelm Büchsel, called Operation Plan III (Operationsplan III), with minor adjustments made to the amphibious landing locations and the immediate tactical goals.

The Imperial German Navy, under Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, expanded greatly from 1898 to 1906 in order to challenge the British Royal Navy. It never was large enough to carry out any plans against the US, and there is no indication that they were ever seriously considered. The German Army, under Field Marshal Alfred von Schlieffen, assigned at least 100,000 troops in the invasion, was certain that the proposal would end in defeat. The plans were permanently shelved in 1906 and did not become fully public until 1970 when they were discovered in the German military archive in Freiburg[2] (an additional "rediscovery" occurred in 2002).[3]

The general staffs of all major powers made hypothetical war plans. The main objective of them was to estimate the amount of resources necessary to carry them out so that if the crisis ever emerged, precious time would not be wasted in developing them. Since all nations did it routinely, there is no sense that the plans developed by junior officers had any impact on national decision-making. Most of the plans never left the War Department.[4]

  1. ^ "US Ship Force Levels".
  2. ^ Cite error: The named reference nyt-1971 was invoked but never defined (see the help page).
  3. ^ Sietz, Henning (8 May 2002). "In New York wird die größte Panik ausbrechen: Wie Kaiser Wilhelm II. die USA mit einem Militärschlag niederzwingen wollte". Zeit Online (in German). Die Zeit.
  4. ^ Max Boot (2006). War Made New: Technology, Warfare, and the Course of History, 1500 to Today. Gotham Books. p. 122. ISBN 9781592402229.

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