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Indo–Pakistani war of 1965 | |||||||||
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Part of the Cold War and Indo–Pakistani wars and conflicts | |||||||||
![]() ![]() Top, bottom: Indian soldiers with a destroyed Pakistani M4A1 Sherman tank Pakistani soldiers maneuvering a captured Indian AMX-13 tank | |||||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||||
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Commanders and leaders | |||||||||
Lal Bahadur Shastri Jayanto Nath Chaudhuri Arjan Singh Joginder Dhillon Harbaksh Singh Har Kishan Sibal Z. C. Bakshi |
Muhammad Ayub Khan Muhammad Musa Nur Khan A. H. Malik Yahya Khan Abrar Hussain S. M. Anwar | ||||||||
Strength | |||||||||
700,000 infantry (whole army)[2] 628 Artillery[4] Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]
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260,000 infantry (whole army)[2] 552 Artillery[4] Effective strength on the West Pakistan Border[5]
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Casualties and losses | |||||||||
Neutral claims[6] |
The Indo-Pakistani war of 1965, also known as the second India–Pakistan war, was an armed conflict between Pakistan and India that took place from August 1965 to September 1965. The conflict began following Pakistan's unsuccessful Operation Gibraltar,[11] which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule.[12] The seventeen-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II.[13][14] Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.[15] Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armored units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations.
India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared.[16][17][18][19][20][21][22] Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan,[23][17][24][25][26][27][28] as it had not succeeded in fomenting an insurrection in Kashmir and was instead forced to shift gears in the defense of Lahore.[29] However, in terms of aerial warfare, the PAF managed an upper hand over the combat zones despite being numerically inferior.[30][31][32][33] India failed to achieve its objective of military deterrence and did not capitalize on its advantageous military situation before the ceasefire was declared.[34][35]
Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent.[36] Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides.[36][37] As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively.[37] The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. Despite improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers until now.[38][39][40]
The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.
The conflict was short, but nasty. After seventeen days, both sides accepted a UN Security Council call for a cease-fire. Although the two militaries fought to a standoff, India won by not losing.
Conley
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).In the final analysis Pakistan maintained air superiority over the combat zones from 6 September onwards
Careful analysis available in the public domain tends to list IAF losses as sixty-five aircraft to all causes and PAF losses at twenty-five aircraft….Finally, there was agreement that the losses suffered by the IAF were not commensurate with the value gained in terms of the effect on the adversary and its combat efficiency.
point that the PAF's superior strategy enabled it to win air superiority by 5 September bears serious consideration. The preemptive air strike over the Indian air fields and the subsequent provocation of the IAF to fight over the heavily defended Pakistani airfields did indeed result in heavy attrition of the IAF's aircraft.
In the brief 1965 war between India and Pakistan, the two air forces were heavily engaged. The Pakistan Air Force (PAF) was able to inflict greater casualties despite being smaller. This owed much to the technical superiority of the PAF's F-86 Sabres over the IAF's Hunters and Mysteres.