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In metaphysics, nominalism is the view that universals and abstract objects do not actually exist other than being merely names or labels.[1][2] There are at least two main versions of nominalism. One version denies the existence of universals – things that can be instantiated or exemplified by many particular things (e.g., strength, humanity). The other version specifically denies the existence of abstract objects – objects that do not exist in space and time.[3]
Most nominalists have held that only physical particulars in space and time are real, and that universals exist only post res, that is, subsequent to particular things.[4] However, some versions of nominalism hold that some particulars are abstract entities (e.g., numbers), while others are concrete entities – entities that do exist in space and time (e.g., pillars, snakes, and bananas). Nominalism is primarily a position on the problem of universals. It is opposed to realist philosophies, such as Platonic realism, which assert that universals do exist over and above particulars, and to the hylomorphic substance theory of Aristotle, which asserts that universals are immanently real within them; however, the name "nominalism" emerged from debates in medieval philosophy with Roscellinus.
The term nominalism stems from the Latin nomen, "name". John Stuart Mill summarised nominalism in his apothegm "there is nothing general except names".[5] In philosophy of law, nominalism finds its application in what is called constitutional nominalism.[6]
- ^ "nominalism". Lexico UK English Dictionary. Oxford University Press. Archived from the original on August 26, 2021.
- ^ Mill (1872); Bigelow (1998).
- ^ Rodriguez-Pereyra (2008) writes: "The word 'Nominalism', as used by contemporary philosophers in the Anglo-American tradition, is ambiguous. In one sense, its most traditional sense deriving from the Middle Ages, it implies the rejection of universals. In another, more modern but equally entrenched sense, it implies the rejection of abstract objects" (§1).
- ^ Feibleman (1962), p. 211.
- ^ Mill, J.S. (1865/1877). An Examination of Sir William Hamilton's Philosophy, Volume II, Chapter XVII, p. 50.
- ^ An overview of the philosophical problems and an application of the concept to a case of the Supreme Court of the State of California, gives Thomas Kupka, 'Verfassungsnominalismus', in: Archives for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy 97 (2011), 44–77, PDF.