Movements in cognitive science are considered to be post-cognitivist if they are opposed to or move beyond the cognitivist theories posited by Noam Chomsky, Jerry Fodor, David Marr, and others.
Postcognitivists challenge tenets within cognitivism, including ontological dualism, representational realism, that cognition is independent of processes outside the mind and nervous system, that the electronic computer is an appropriate analogy for the mind, and that cognition occurs only within individuals.[1]
Researchers who have followed post-cognitive directions include James J. Gibson, Hubert Dreyfus, Gregory Bateson, Michael Turvey, Bradd Shore, Jerome Bruner, Vittorio Guidano, Humberto Maturana and Francisco Varela.[2]
- ^ Wallace, B; Ross, A; Davies, J.B; Anderson, T (2007). The Mind, the Body and the World: Psychology after Cognitivism. London: Imprint Academic. ISBN 978-1-84540-073-6.
- ^ Varela, F., Thompson, E., & Rosch, E. (1991). The embodied mind: Cognitive science and human experience. Cambridge MA: MIT Press.