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United States v. Lopez | |
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Argued November 8, 1994 Decided April 26, 1995 | |
Full case name | United States v. Alfonzo Lopez, Jr. |
Citations | 514 U.S. 549 (more) 115 S. Ct. 1624; 131 L. Ed. 2d 626; 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039; 63 U.S.L.W. 4343; 95 Cal. Daily Op. Service 3074; 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 752 |
Argument | Oral argument |
Case history | |
Prior | On writ of certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) |
Holding | |
Possession of a handgun near a school is not an economic activity and doesn't have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, and therefore cannot be regulated by Congress. The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 is unconstitutional. | |
Court membership | |
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Case opinions | |
Majority | Rehnquist, joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas |
Concurrence | Kennedy, joined by O'Connor |
Concurrence | Thomas |
Dissent | Stevens |
Dissent | Souter |
Dissent | Breyer, joined by Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg |
Laws applied | |
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 |
United States v. Alfonso D. Lopez, Jr., 514 U.S. 549 (1995), was a landmark case of the United States Supreme Court that struck down the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA) as it was outside of Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce. It was the first case since 1937 in which the Court held that Congress had exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause.
The case arose from a San Antonio high school student's challenge to the GFSZA, which banned possession of handguns within 1,000 feet (300 meters) of a school. In a majority decision joined by four other justices, Chief Justice William Rehnquist held that Lopez' possession of the gun was not economic activity and its scope was not sufficiently cabined, and so was outside the broad reach of the Commerce Clause. After the Lopez decision, the GFSZA was amended to specifically only apply to guns that had been moved via interstate or foreign commerce.[1][2][3]
Though it did not reverse any past ruling about the meaning of the Commerce Clause, Lopez raised serious questions as to how far the Court might be willing to go in curbing Congress' commerce powers. This decision was a slight return to the original commerce clause precedent set in Gibbons v. Ogden in which Justice Marshall held that federal law may control state law only when necessary to effectively exercise an enumerated power, and it may not otherwise deny the states' authority to govern in the same area.[4] The Court would later further limit congressional powers under the Commerce Clause in United States v. Morrison (2000).
amended
was invoked but never defined (see the help page).